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ABSTRACT 
Strategy-proofness, requiring that truth-telling is a dominant strategy, is a standard 
concept used in social choice theory. Saijo et al. (2003) argue that this concept has serious 
drawbacks.  In particular, many strategy-proof mechanisms have a continuum of Nash 
equilibria, including equilibria other than dominant strategy equilibria. For only a subset of 
strategy-proof mechanisms do the set of Nash equilibria and the set of dominant strategy 
equilibria coincide. For example, this double coincidence occurs in the Groves mechanism when 
preferences are single-peaked.  We report experiments using two strategy-proof mechanisms. 
One of them has a large number of Nash equilibria, but the other has a unique Nash 
equilibrium.  We found clear differences in the rate of dominant strategy play between the two. 
Journal of Economic Literature Classification Number: C92, D71, D78, and H41.  
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1. Introduction 
Strategy-proofness, requiring that truth-telling is a dominant strategy, is a standard concept that 
has been used in the design of a variety of mechanisms for social choice as well as for eliciting 
values for non-market goods. Its main appeal is that it relies on what would seem to be one of 
the most basic game-theoretic notions and apparently innocuous assumptions for behavior: that 
players adopt dominant strategies. Theorists often fail to recognize, however, that laboratory 
evidence calls into question the descriptive relevance of this assumption. For example, Attiyeh, 
Franciosi, and Isaac (2000) and Kawagoe and Mori (2001) report pivotal mechanism 
experiments in which subjects adopt dominant strategies less than half the time, and Kagel, 
Harstad, and Levin (1987), Kagel and Levin (1993) and Harstad (2000) report second price 
auction experiments in which most bids do not reveal true value. Attiyeh, Franciosi, and Isaac 
(2000) conclude pessimistically (p. 112) “we do not believe that the pivot mechanism warrants 
further practical consideration…This is due to the fundamental failure of the mechanism, in our 
laboratory experiments, to induce truthful value revelation”.   
  Experimentalists sometimes argue that players who use weakly dominated strategies 
must suffer from confusion due to the complexity of the mechanism and the non-transparency 
of the dominant strategy.  But in fact, neither “epistemic” (deductive) nor “evolutive” (dynamic) 
models provide unambiguous support for the elimination of weakly dominated strategies. 
According to the epistemic model, if each player is perfectly rational and can deduce what 
strategies the opponent will use, then the outcome of the game must be a Nash equilibrium 
(Aumann and Brandenburger, 1995), but there is nothing that forces a player to eliminate 
weakly dominated strategies. However, the epistemic model seems almost irrelevant when 
interpreting behavior in experiments, because very few subjects appear to consciously compute 
equilibria. (Consequently, behavior in the first round of play is often far from equilibrium.)  The  
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dynamic perspective may be more relevant because it considers the changing behavior of 
boundedly rational players who play many times.1 The dynamic models do not assume that the 
players deduce the opponent’s action from complete information about payoff functions. 
Convergence to Nash equilibrium is solely based on players reacting to each other’s previous 
actions. Consequently, even if the payoff functions are privately known, the long-run outcome 
may approximate a Nash equilibrium of the corresponding complete information game (see 
Hurwicz, 1972, and Smith, 2002). But while the rest points of dynamic processes such as 
fictitious play must be Nash equilibria, there is no guarantee that weakly dominated strategies 
will be eliminated. Intuitively, the feedback the players receive may be very weak because the 
use of a weakly dominated strategy may not cause any loss in payoff. Binmore, Gale and 
Samuelson (1995) and Kagel and Levin (1993) argue that this weak feedback effect can explain 
some experimental results, and Cabrales and Ponti (2000) discuss the implications for 
mechanism design.  Of course, epistemic and evolutive models do provide clear-cut support for 
the elimination of strictly dominated strategies. The problem is that very few social choice rules 
are implementable in strictly dominant strategies.  
Motivated by this problem, Saijo, Sjöström and Yamato (2003) developed a new concept 
called secure implementation. A social choice function is securely implementable if there exists a 
mechanism (game form) that implements it in dominant strategy equilibria, and the set of 
dominant strategy equilibrium outcomes and the set of Nash equilibrium outcomes coincide.  
That is, all Nash equilibrium outcomes must be socially optimal in a secure mechanism.  The 
current paper takes a first step towards establishing the empirical significance of these ideas. 
We report a new experiment comparing the rate of dominant strategy adoption for the pivotal 
mechanism (where implementation is not secure) and for the Groves-Clarke mechanism when 
                                                      
1 Hurwicz (1972), Muench and Walker (1983), Cabrales and Ponti (2000) and others have looked at mechanism 
design from a dynamic perspective.  
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preferences are single-peaked (where implementation is secure). Our results indicate that 
subjects play dominant strategies significantly more often in the secure Groves-Clarke 
mechanism than in the non-secure pivotal mechanism, even though we have simplified both 
mechanisms with context-free payoff tables. Our findings suggest that the highly pessimistic 
conclusion of Attiyeh, Franciosi, and Isaac (2000) should be modified to allow the possibility 
that a Groves-Clarke mechanism can perform satisfactorily in environments where 
implementation is secure. 
Recently, Chen (2005) argued that mechanisms used for Nash implementation might 
perform better if they induce supermodular games, because supermodularity guarantees 
convergence of standard learning processes. On the other hand, supermodularity is not a 
necessary condition for convergence of these learning processes. In contrast, we study dominant 
strategy mechanisms. In this context, for any learning dynamics with the property that all Nash 
equilibria are rest points, secure implementation is necessary for global convergence to a 
desirable outcome.  In the environment we study in this paper, it is sufficient as well. 
The practical relevance of secure mechanisms is enhanced by the fact that for any 
common prior over the set of possible valuation functions, all Bayesian Nash equilibria will 
produce the socially optimal outcome.  Thus, secure mechanisms will perform well if the agents 
are Bayesian expected utility maximizers with a common prior, but the social planner does not 
know what this prior is.  The importance of this type of consideration will increase as more 
mechanisms are implemented in the field. Auctions provide an important example. The English 
(ascending price) auction is an important mechanism that has been used since at least 500 B.C. 
in Babylon (Cassady, 1967). Theorists have noted the strategic equivalence between English and 
second price auctions since Vickrey (1961), but for some information conditions the second price 
auction is strategy-proof but not securely implementable. Until recently the second price  
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auction has not been adopted in the field, although this is likely to change as online auctions 
grow in importance. Bidders in online auctions at eBay and Amazon can submit a reservation 
price (called a proxy bid) early in the auction, and if this bid is highest then this bidder wins the 
auction and pays only the minimum bid increment above the second-highest submitted price. 
This institution shares a number of incentive features of theoretical second price auctions, 
although as currently implemented submitting one’s reservation price is generally not a 
dominant strategy (Roth and Ockenfels, 2002).  But the adoption of true sealed-bid second price 
auctions may grow over time, particularly for intermediate goods and in procurement 
(“business-to-business”) transactions. As we illustrate in Section 3, however, under some 
information conditions the second price auction for a single indivisible good has “bad” Nash 
equilibrium outcomes in the sense that the agent with the highest value does not receive the 
good. This suggests that proponents of second price auctions may want to be more cautious 
when proposing them for online markets or to elicit valuations for non-market goods. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a brief review of 
the laboratory evidence on strategy-proof mechanisms. Section 3 gives examples of two well-
known strategy-proof mechanisms that have a continuum of Nash equilibria, including 
equilibria other than the dominant strategy equilibrium that theorists usually focus on. We 
characterize secure implementability in Section 4 for the case of two agents and quasi-linear 
preferences that is relevant for our experiment (Saijo et al. (2003) presents results for more 
general conditions).  Section 5 describes the experimental environment and Section 6 contains 
the experimental results.  Section 7 provides concluding remarks. 
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2. Experimental Results on Strategy-Proof Mechanisms 
  Until recently, most of the experimental studies of strategy-proof mechanisms have 
considered the second price auction (Vickrey, 1961). For example, Coppinger, Smith and Titus 
(1980) studied the relationship between Dutch, English, first price sealed-bid and second price 
sealed-bid auctions. Bidders in both the English and the second price auction have a dominant 
strategy to fully reveal their resale value in their bid (or reveal their value in their “drop-out 
price” in the case of the English auction). Bidders in Coppinger et al.’s (oral) English auctions 
typically dropped out of the bidding when predicted, so prices corresponded to the equilibrium 
prediction—the second-highest bidders’ resale value. Similarly, Kagel, Harstad and Levin 
(1987) show that bidders in English (clock) auctions lock on to the dominant strategy of bidding 
equal to value after a few periods of initially overbidding. 
Bidders in Coppinger et al.’s second price auctions were prohibited from bidding above 
their resale value. Kagel and Levin (1993) find, however, that 58 to 67 percent of second price 
auction bids are greater than resale value, which they attribute to (1) the equilibrium bidding 
strategy being less transparent than in the English auction and (2) learning feedback to 
discourage overbidding is weak under sealed-bid procedures because typically the overbidding 
is not “punished” with losses.  Harstad (2000) also documents rather severe overbidding in 
second price auctions that does not decline over time but that may be less pronounced when 
subjects first obtain experience in English auctions. Garratt, Walker and Wooders (2002) show 
that bidders who are highly experienced in online auctions are no more likely to overbid than to 
underbid, but as with inexperienced bidders only very few (roughly 20 percent) of bids are 
approximately equal to value. Most bids in the Garratt et al. study vary considerably from the 
bidders’ true values, and consequently less than one half of the auctions result in efficient 
allocations. Overall the data clearly indicate that subjects do not play their dominant strategy,  
  8 
and in all cases the evidence suggests that bidding equal to value is significantly more common 
in English than in second price auctions. 
While the transparency, experience and feedback explanations for the lower frequency 
of dominant strategy play in the second price auction are all plausible, we propose a 
complementary explanation. In English auctions with a stage-game structure, the (sub-game 
perfect) Nash equilibrium outcome coincides with the dominant strategy equilibrium outcome 
in which bids fully reveal values. But in second price sealed-bid auctions with a one-shot game 
structure, Nash equilibria that do not coincide with the dominant strategy equilibrium exist and 
involve overbidding and underbidding. For example, suppose bidder 1 has a value of $555 and 
bidder 2 has a value of $550, and that these values are common knowledge. It is a Nash 
equilibrium for bidder 1 to bid $540 and bidder 2 to bid $560, resulting in the inefficient 
allocation of the object to bidder 2. Kagel and Levin (1993) and others have noted that 
overbidding is not discouraged because bidders can bid above values and not lose money. It is 
precisely this feature of the second price auction institution that causes “bad” Nash equilibria to 
exist.  
More recent experiments have studied the pivotal mechanism, which is a strategy-proof 
social choice mechanism that is strategically equivalent to the second price auction.2,3 In this 
mechanism an agent pays the amount needed to implement his preferred outcome only if his 
report is pivotal and changes the chosen outcome. These studies have also documented that 
subjects frequently do not play dominant strategies. Attiyeh, Franciosi and Isaac (2000) find that 
                                                      
2 Another truth-telling mechanism that has been widely employed in experiments is the Becker-DeGroot-Marshak 
(BDM) mechanism. In this mechanism the subject states a maximum buying price or minimum selling price, but the 
actual buying or selling price is determined by a randomizing device and the transaction is carried out if it is 
acceptable giving the subject’s reported maximum or minimum. This mechanism is not a game so it is not directly 
relevant for our study. 
3 We do not review here other social choice mechanism experiments like the serial cost sharing mechanism because 
the researchers have implemented those mechanisms in environments where the Nash equilibria are not in dominant 
strategies (e.g., Chen, 2003; Dorsey and Razzolini, 1999).  
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less than 10 percent of the bids reveal the subjects’ true value for the public good, in a setting 
where the experimenter explained the mapping of bids to outcomes (and required taxes for the 
pivotal players) for five- and ten-person groups. Part of the poor performance of this 
mechanism might be due to subject confusion and the complexity of the pivotal mechanism. 
Kawagoe and Mori (2001) provide support for this interpretation, using a controlled experiment 
that manipulates the complexity across treatments. They also find that only a small number of 
bids (less than 20 percent) reveal true values when the context and complexity of the pivotal 
mechanism is part of the experiment; but when the mechanism is simplified and represented by 
(detailed) payoff tables then nearly half of the subjects play the dominant strategy.4 In the 
present experiment we also study the pivotal mechanism with detailed payoff tables to help 
simplify the decision environment and promote equilibrium bids. Although confusion and 
complexity may be partly responsible for the poor performance of some mechanisms, we will 
try to go beyond this explanation.   We will argue that the existence of multiple Nash equilibria 
allows us to predict how behavior will deviate from the dominant strategy equilibrium.  That is, 
we will identify systematic rather than random deviations from the dominant strategy 
equilibrium in non-secure mechanisms.  
 
3.  Why do Strategy-Proof Mechanisms Not Work Well? 
  Many of the strategy-proof mechanisms that have been studied in the literature have 
Nash equilibrium outcomes that do not coincide with the dominant strategy equilibrium 
                                                      
4 Charness, Frechette and Kagel (2004) also provide experimental evidence that the use of payoff tables significantly 
affects behavior, but in a very different economic environment that features sequential decisions and the potential for 
reciprocal exchanges. One interpretation they offer for this finding is that the payoff tables clarify the monetary and 
distributional considerations of alternative actions.  
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outcome. These Nash equilibrium outcomes are frequently socially undesirable. This is 
illustrated be the following two well-known strategy-proof mechanisms.5  
  
Example 1: The pivotal mechanism (Clarke, 1971). 
Consider the pivotal mechanism, which is one of the two mechanisms studied in the 
present experiment, for a two-agent economy with a binary non-excludable public good and 
quasi-linear preferences. Two agents 1 and 2 are facing a decision whether or not they should 
produce the public good. Agent i's true net value of the public good is vi  if it is produced, and 
her true net value is 0 otherwise (i = 12 , ). In the pivotal mechanism, each agent i reports his net 
value ~ vi and the outcome is determined as follows:  
 
Rule 1: if ~~ , vv 12 0 +≥  then the public good is produced, and if not, then it is not produced; and 
Rule 2: each agent i must pay the pivotal tax ti 
 
ti  = −~ vj     if ~ vj < 0 and ~~ vv 12 0 +≥  
           =  ~ vj      if ~ vj > 0 and ~~ vv 12 0 + <  
                 =  0        otherwise 
where  j i ≠ .  
That is, an agent pays the amount needed to implement his preferred outcome if his report is 
pivotal and changes the chosen outcome. 
 First,  let  (,)( ,) vv 12 54 =−  be the true net value vector. Figure 1-(a) shows that the set of 
Nash equilibria is approximately a half of the two dimensional area.  Notice that the public 
good should be produced because the sum of the net values of the public good is positive.  The 
upper-right part of the set of Nash equilibria is “good” in the sense that constructing the public 
good is recommended.  However, the lower-left part of the set of Nash equilibria is “bad” in the 
sense that producing the public good is not recommended.   
                                                      
5 Other examples of strategy-proof mechanisms where “bad” Nash equilibria lead to inefficient outcomes include the 
Condorcet winner (median voter) scheme with single-peaked preferences, the uniform allocation rule (a fixed-price 
trading rule) with single-peaked preferences, and the top trading cycle rule in a market with indivisible goods.  
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Second, let ( , ) ( , ) vv 12 55 =  be the true net value vector.  In this case, both agents want to 
construct the public good.  However, Figure 1-(b) shows the area of bad Nash equilibria is still 
large. Saijo et al. (2003) generalize this negative result to the case with any arbitrary finite 
numbers of public projects and agents. 
 
---------------------------------- 
Link to Figure 1 
---------------------------------- 
 
Example 2: The second price auction (Vickrey, 1961). 
 Consider a two-agent model with an indivisible good.  Agent i's true value of the good is 
vi≥ 0 if she receives it, and her true value is 0 otherwise (i= 12, ).  Let (~ ,~ ) vv 12   be a reported 
value vector.  The second price auction consists of two rules:  
 
Rule 1: if ~~ vv ij > , then agent i receives the good and pays ~vj ( i j i j ,, ; =≠ 12 ); and 
Rule 2: if ~~ vv 12 = , then agent 1 receives the good and pays ~v2 . 
  
 Let  ( , ) ( , ) vv 12 75 =  be the true value vector.  Figure 2 shows that the set of Nash 
equilibria is quite large.  Notice that agent 1 should receive the good because her value is 
greater than agent 2's.  The lower-right part of the set of Nash equilibria is “good” in the sense 
that agent 1 receives the good.  However, the upper-left part of the set of Nash equilibria 
involving overbidding is “bad” in the sense that agent 2 receives the good. 
 
---------------------------------
Link to Figure 2 
---------------------------------- 
We do not dispute the possibility that, in practice, some confused bidders may fail to 
recognize their dominant strategy because it is not transparent (e.g., Harstad, 2000). However, 
our key observation is that the Nash equilibrium areas shown in Figure 2 indicate the possibility 
of systematic rather than random deviations from the dominant strategy equilibrium.   
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4.  Secure Implementation in Public Good Economies 
The previous section presented two examples drawn from many strategy-proof 
mechanisms that may have “bad” Nash equilibria.  They implement the social choice function 
(SCF) in dominant strategies, but not in Nash equilibria. Saijo et al. (2003) introduce a new 
concept of implementation, called secure implementation, which does not share this 
shortcoming. 
We introduce notation and definitions here to describe the concept of secure 
implementation in the context of public good economies with two agents and quasi-linear 
preferences. Denote the set of feasible allocations by 
  Ay t t y Y t t =∈ ∈ ℜ {( , , ) , , } 12 12 , 
where Y ⊆ℜis a production possibility set, y Y ∈  is an output level of a public good, and ti is a 
transfer of a private good to agent i.  For simplicity, we assume that there is no cost involved in 
producing y.  Each agent i’s utility function, ui : A → ℜ, is selfish and quasi-linear: 
  u y t t u y t v y t ii i i i (, , ) (,) () 12== + ,   i = 12 ,.  
The class of valuation functions, vi : Y → ℜ, admissible for agent i is denoted by Vi . Following 
Holmström (1979), suppose Vi  is smoothly connected.  Let v = ( , ) vv 12  ∈ V ≡ V V 12 ×  be a 
valuation profile.   
A social choice function (SCF) is a function f : V → A that associates with every list of 
valuation functions, v ∈ V, a unique feasible allocation f (v) in A.  The allocation f (v) is said to be 
f-optimal for v. 
 A  mechanism (or game form) is a function g: SS 12 × → A that assigns a unique element of 
A to every ( , ) ss S S 12 1 2 ∈×, where Si is the strategy space of agent i. For a strategy profile 
ss s SS =∈ × (,) 12 1 2 , the outcome of g for the profile s is denoted by gs y s t s gg () ( () , () ) = , where 
ys g()  is the level of the public good and ts ts ts g gg () ( () , () ) = 12  is the transfer vector.   
The strategy profile ss s SS = ∈ × (,) 12 1 2 is a Nash equilibrium of g at v ∈ V if 
vyss tss vyss tss g g g g
11 2 1 12 1 12 1 12 ((,) ) (,) ((,) ) (,) +≥ ′ + ′  for all  ′ ∈ sS 11 , and   
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vyss tss vyss tss g g g g
21 2 2 12 2 12 2 12 ((,) ) (,) ((,) ) (,) +≥ ′ + ′  for all  ′ ∈ sS 22 . 
Let Nv A
g( ) be the set of Nash equilibrium allocations of g at v, i.e., Nv A
g()   ≡ {(( , , ) y t t 12 ∈ A | 
there exists a Nash equilibrium at v, s ∈ S, such that g s y t t () (, , ) = 12}.   
The strategy profile ss s SS = ∈ × (,) 12 1 2  is a dominant strategy equilibrium of g at v ∈ V if 
vyss tss vyss tss g g g g
11 2 1 12 1 12 1 12 ((,) ) (,) ((,) ) (,) ′ + ′ ≥ ′′+ ′′  for all  ′ ∈ sS 11 and  ′ ∈ sS 22 ; and  
2 12 212 2 12 212 ((,) ) (,) ((,) ) (,)
gg gg v y ss tss vy ss tss ′ ′ ′′ ′′ +≥ + for all  ′ ∈ sS 11 and  ′ ∈ sS 22 . 
Let  ()
g
A Dv  be the set of dominant strategy equilibrium allocations of g at v, i.e.,  ( )
g
A Dv  ≡ 
{(( , , ) y t t 12 ∈ A | there exists a dominant strategy equilibrium at v, s ∈ S, such 
that g s y t t () (, , ) = 12}.  
 
Definition 1. The mechanism g implements the SCF f in dominant strategy equilibria if for all v ∈ V, 
f (v) = 
g
A D (v).  f is implementable in dominant strategy equilibria if there exists a mechanism which 
implements f in dominant strategy equilibria.  
 
Definition 2. The mechanism g securely implements the SCF f if for all v V ∈ ,  f v () =  
g
A D (u) = 
NA
g (u).6  The SCF f is securely implementable if there exists a mechanism which securely 
implements f.   
 
Dominant strategy implementation requires that for every possible preference profile, 
the dominant strategy equilibrium outcome coincides with the f-optimal outcome. In addition to 
this requirement, secure implementation demands that there be no Nash equilibrium outcome 
other than the dominant strategy equilibrium outcome. 
  Saijo et al. (2003) characterize the class of securely implementable SCF's using two 
conditions. The first condition is strategy-proofness.  The allocation recommended by the SCF f 
                                                      
6 Secure implementation is identical to double implementation in dominant strategy equilibria and Nash equilibria.  It 
was Maskin (1979) who first introduced the concept of double implementation. See also Yamato (1993).  
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for the profilevv v =(,) 12  is denoted by  fv y vt v ff () ( () , () ) = , where yv f ( ) is the level of the 
public good and tv tv tv f ff () ( () , () ) = 12 is the transfer vector. 
 
Definition 3. The SCF f is strategy-proof if  
      vyvv tvv vyvv tvv f f f f
11 2 1 12 1 12 1 12 ((, ~ )) ( ,~ )( ( ~ ,~ )) (~ ,~ ) +≥ + for all ~ vV 11 ∈ and ~ vV 22 ∈ ; and  
       2 12 212 2 12 212 ((,) ) (,) ((,) ) (,)
ff ff v y vv tvv vy vv tvv +≥ +     for all ~ vV 11 ∈ and ~ vV 22 ∈ . 
 
By the Revelation Principle (Gibbard, 1973), strategy-proofness is necessary for dominant 
strategy implementation, and therefore also for secure implementation. However, the following 
additional condition, called the rectangular property, is necessary for secure implementation.  
 
Definition 4.  The SCF f satisfies the rectangular property if for all vv V ,~∈ , if 
vyvv tvv vyvv tvv f f f f
11 2 1 12 1 12 1 12 ((, ~ )) ( ,~ )( ( ~ ,~ )) (~ ,~ ) += + and 
vyvv tvv vyvv tvv f f f f
21 2 1 12 2 12 2 12 (( ~ ,) ) ( ~ ,) (( ~ ,~ )) (~ ,~ ) += +, 
then  f vv (,) 12 = fv v (~ ,~ ) 12  . 
 
  Saijo et al. (2003) show that the rectangular property is necessary and sufficient for sure 
implementation:7 
                                                      
7 To see why the rectangular property is necessary for secure implementation intuitively, suppose that the direct 
revelation mechanism g = f securely implements the SCF f.  Let n = 2  and (,) vv 12  be the true preference profile.  
Suppose uf vv 11 2 (( , ~ )) =   uf vv 11 2 (( ~ ,~ )) , i.e., 
 (*)  vy vv t vv vy vv t vv f f f f
11 2 1 12 1 12 1 12 ((, ~ )) ( ,~ )( ( ~ ,~ )) (~ ,~ ) += +. 
In other words, agent 1 is indifferent between reporting the true preference  v1  and reporting another preference ~ v1  
when agent 2’s report is ~ v2 .  Since reporting  v1  is a dominant strategy by strategy-proofness, it follows from (*) that  
vy vv t vv vy vv t vv f f f f
11 2 1 12 1 12 1 12 (( ~ ,~ )) (~ ,~ )( ( , ~ )) ( ,~ ) += + ≥ ′ + ′ vy vv t vv f f
11 2 1 12 ((, ~ )) ( ,~ )  for all  ′ ∈ vV 11 ,  
that is, reporting ~ v1  is one of agent 1’s best responses when agent 2 reports ~ v2 .   
Next suppose that uf vv uf vv 21 2 21 2 (( ~ ,) ) ( ( ~ ,~ )) = , i.e., 
(**)  vyvv tvv vyvv tvv f f f f
21 2 1 12 2 12 2 12 (( ~ ,) ) ( ~ ,) (( ~ ,~ )) (~ ,~ ) += +. 
By using an argument similar to the above, it is easy to see that  vyvv tvv vyvv tvv f f f f
21 2 2 12 2 12 2 12 (( ~ ,~ )) (~ ,~ )( ( ~ ,) ) ( ~ ,) += + 
≥ ′ + ′ vyvv tvv f f
21 2 1 12 (( ~ ,) ) ( ~ , ) for all  ′ ∈ vV 22 ,   
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Theorem 1.  An SCF is securely implementable if and only if it satisfies strategy-proofness and the 
rectangular property. 
 
  Let us consider an SCF f satisfying the efficiency condition on the public good  
provision: 
 
(4.1)  yvv vy vy f
yY
( , ) a r g m a x [ () () ] 12 1 2 ∈+
∈
 for all ( , ) vv V 12 ∈ . 
  
The following result is well known: 
 
Proposition 1 (Clarke, 1971; Groves, 1973; Green and Laffont, 1979; Holmström, 1979). An SCF f 
satisfying (4.1) is implementable in dominant strategy equilibria if and only if f satisfies  
 
 (4.2)  tvv vyvv h v
f f
1 12 2 12 12 (,) ((,) ) () =+ , tvv vyvv hv
f f
2 12 1 12 21 (,) ((,) ) () =+  ∀∈ (,) vv V 12 , 
 
where hi is some arbitrary function which does not depend on vi. 
 
A direct revelation mechanism satisfying (4.1) and (4.2) is called a Groves-Clarke mechanism.  
Proposition 1 says that we can focus on the class of Groves-Clarke mechanisms for 
implementation of an SCF satisfying (4.1) in dominant strategy equilibria. In general, Groves-
Clarke mechanisms do not achieve secure implementation. However, if V contains only single-
peaked preferences and y is a continuous variable, then SCF’s satisfying (4.1) are securely 
implementable by Groves-Clarke mechanisms.  Suppose that Y = ℜand for i = 12 , ,  
  Vv v y y rr ii i i i =ℜ → ℜ = − − ∈ ℜ {: ( ) ( ) , } 2 ,  
                                                                                                                                                                           
that is, reporting ~ v2  is one of agent 2’s best responses when agent 1 reports ~ v1 .  Therefore,  fv v (~ ,~ ) 12 =  
(( ~ ,~ ), (~ ,~ )) yvvtvv ff
12 12is the Nash equilibrium outcome.  Moreover,  fv v y v v t v v ff (,)((,) ,(,) ) 12 12 12 =  is the dominant 
strategy outcome, and by secure implementability, the dominant strategy outcome coincides with the Nash 
equilibrium outcome.  Accordingly we conclude that  fv v (,) 12 = fv v (~ ,~ ) 12  if (*) and (**) hold.  
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where ri  is agent i's most preferred level of the public good.  We can represent these single-
peaked preferences by the ri  instead of the vi.  The optimal output level of the public good 
satisfying (4.1) is given by y r r (,) 12= (r1+r2)/2. In this case any SCF f meeting (4.1) and (4.2) 
satisfies the rectangular property and is therefore securely implementable (Saijo et al., 2003). 
  Consider an example that will be used in our experimental design later, in which hi = 0. 
Then,  
 
urr vy rr trr 112 1 12 112 (~ ,~ )( ( ~ ,~ )) (~ ,~ ) =+  = −+ − −+ − ((~~ )/ ) ((~~ )/ ~ ) rr r rr r 12 1
2
12 2
2 22   
   =− − + − (~ )( ~ )/ rr rr 11
2
21
2 2 {}  
where r1  is player 1’s true peak and (~ ,~ ) rr 12 is a vector of reported peaks. Clearly agent 1’s 
payoff is maximized at r1 .  Since the payoff function is quadratic, no other maximizers exist. 
Furthermore, the payoff is maximized at r1  regardless of ~ r2 . Figure 3 shows agent 1’s payoff 
when r1 12 = . If ~ r2 4 = , the maximizer is a, and if ~ r2 12 = , it is b. Both are maximized at r1 12 = . 
Therefore, the best response curve is a line parallel to the ~ r2  axis. This indicates that truth-
telling is the dominant strategy.  In fact, it is strictly dominant. However, this is true only as long 
as the public goods level is continuously variable. In our experiment, we will discretize the 
public goods level and the payoff functions, and truth-telling will not be strictly dominant even 
though preferences are single-peaked.8 However, with single-peaked preferences 
implementation will still be secure, because there will be a unique dominant strategy 
equilibrium which is also a unique Nash equilibrium (Treatment S).   When preferences are not 
single peaked, there will be multiple Nash equilibria and implementation is not secure 
(Treatment P). 
 
                                                      
8 In general, with a discrete public good, single-peaked preferences will not assure the existence of a strictly 
dominant strategy. However, secure implementation will be assured.  
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---------------------------------- 
Link to Figure 3
---------------------------------- 
 
 5. The Experiment 
  Our experiment studies the pivotal mechanism and a Groves-Clarke mechanism with 
single-peaked preferences.  It consisted of four sessions with 20 subjects each (80 total subjects). 
We conducted two sessions in Treatment P that corresponded to the pivotal mechanism and 
two sessions in Treatment S that corresponded to a Groves mechanism with single-peaked 
preferences. All sessions employed payoff tables to simplify the presentation of the two 
mechanisms to subjects. As already noted above in Section 2, previous findings by Kawagoe 
and Mori (2001) suggest that this reduction in complexity may improve the performance of the 
mechanisms. We consider the secure mechanisms to be a benchmark, in the sense of having the 
greatest hope of successful implementation, compared to other social choice mechanisms. In 
order to evaluate how this benchmark performs under ideal conditions, we decided in this 
initial experiment to provide favorable, maximally-transparent conditions. The use of payoff 
tables allows for a comparison of the benchmark (secure) mechanism with the non-secure 
alternative, holding their degree of transparency constant.  
Our experiment provides evidence that the existence of Nash equilibria in weakly 
dominated strategies can significantly influence the subjects’ behavior. We suspect that this will 
be the case in many environments, including those where the complexity of the environment 
will lower the performance of any mechanism. This leads us to believe that secure mechanisms 
will perform better in many different environments. Of course, payoff tables are somewhat 
unrealistic for potential applications of these mechanisms in the field. We did not evaluate the 
secure mechanism without payoff tables, so our experiment does not prove that secure 
mechanisms will be successful in the field. Whether or not mechanisms fail in practical 
applications may depend on how well understood they are by the participants. As we discuss 




 We conducted two sessions (one P and one S) at Tokyo Metropolitan University during 
June of 1998 and two sessions (one P and one S) at Purdue University during February of 2003.  
Each session took approximately one hour to complete.   
 Treatment P implements the pivotal mechanism for a two-person group.  The net true 
value vector (  v1  ,  v2  ) is equal to (  ,  ) −6  8   if a binary public good is produced and (  v1  ,  v2  ) = (  ,  ) 00 
otherwise.  The public good should be produced since v1  +  v2≥ 0.  Let the strategy space of type 
1 be the set of integers from -22 to 2, and the strategy space of type 2 be the set of integers from -
4 to 20.  According to the rules of the pivotal mechanism described in Section 3, we can 
construct the payoff matrices of types 1 and 2.  
 The payoff tables that we actually distributed to subjects in Treatment P were Tables 1 
and 2 whose basic structures were the same as the original payoff tables, modified as follows. 
First, we changed the names of strategies.  Type 1's strategy "-22" was renamed "1", "-21" was 
renamed "2", and so on.  Similarly, type 2's strategy "-4" was renamed "1", "-3" was renamed "2", 
and so on.  Second, we employed a linear transformation of the valuation functions:  14  294 1v  + 
for type 1 and 14  182 2v  +   for type 2.  
 
-------------------------------------------
Link to Table 1 and 2
-------------------------------------------- 
Table 3 is a payoff matrix with both players’ payoffs displayed: the left-hand number is 
type 1’s payoff and the right-hand number is type 2’ payoff in each cell. 9  It also specifies the 
dominant strategy equilibria and the other Nash equilibria. Type 1's dominant strategies are 16 
and 17, and type 2's dominant strategies are 12 and 13. The two dominant strategies are 
equivalent for each type in the sense that her payoffs are identical for every possible strategy 
played by the other type; and although payoffs of the other type could be different depending 
                                                      
9 We did not provide this table to any subject. Type 1 subjects used table 1 only and type 2 subjects employed table 2 
only.   
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on her own choices, she did not know the other’s payoffs. In this sense, there is an essentially 
unique dominant strategy in Treatment P. 
Let us look at the best response structure of each type given a strategy of the other type 
in Table 3. For example, (i) when type 2 chooses 8, the payoffs of type 1 are “high” (252) if she 
chooses less than or equal to 19, and her payoffs are “low” (210) otherwise; (ii) when type 2 
chooses 11, the payoffs of type 1 are the same (210) for all her strategies; and (iii) when type 2 
chooses 15, the payoffs of type 1 are “low” (154) if she chooses less than or equal to 12, and her 
payoffs are “high” (210) otherwise. That is, given each strategy of the other type, either a) the 
payoffs of each type are divided into just two “tiers”: a “high” payoff obtained by choosing 
“good” strategies and a “low” payoff by “bad” strategies; or b) the payoffs are the same for all 
strategies. Because the best response function of each type has such a “flat” feature, there is a 
huge set of Nash equilibria in Table 3. The lower-right region of Nash equilibria is “good” in the 
sense that the public good is produced.  The upper-left region of Nash equilibria is “bad” in the 
sense that the public good is not produced.  The number of good Nash equilibria is 162, while 
the number of bad Nash equilibria is 165.  Implementation is clearly not secure.  
 
--------------------------------- 
Link to Table 3
--------------------------------- 
 
As is well known, the pivotal mechanism sometimes generates a surplus, i.e., the tax 
revenue exceeds the cost of producing the public good. (In general, no dominant strategy 
mechanism can both satisfy condition (4.1) and balance the budget). From the point of view of 
the participants, the budget surplus is wasteful. Suppose type 1 chooses either 8 or 17 and type 
2 chooses either 5 or 12. Then the payoff table is given by Table 4. Notice that (17, 12) is a 
dominant strategy equilibrium and (8, 5) is a bad Nash equilibrium. However, the sum of the 
players’ payoffs is greater under the bad Nash equilibrium than under the dominant strategy 
equilibrium (476>420).  For the original case in which the strategy spaces of both types are the  
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set of 25 integers, see Table 5. It is easy to check that 91% (=10/11) of payoffs in the region of 
bad Nash equilibria are not Pareto dominated by either of the dominant strategy equilibrium 
payoffs ((210, 196) or (210, 210)). The corresponding ratio in the region of good Nash equilibria 
is 92% (=150/163). Moreover, the ratio of Pareto efficient payoffs among bad Nash equilibrium 
payoffs is 45.5% (=5/11), while the corresponding ratio among good Nash equilibrium payoffs 
is 27.6% (=45/163).  
 
------------------------------------------ 
Link to Tables 4 & 5
------------------------------------------ 
 
However, the pivotal mechanism was designed specifically to implement social 
decisions that satisfy the efficiency condition (4.1). This condition has played a central role in 
the literature.  The experiments can shed light on whether or not the outcome will in fact be 
consistent with condition (4.1).  If it is not, then the pivotal mechanism does not perform in the 
way described in the literature on efficient mechanism design, and a new theory may be 
needed.  
Treatment S is the same as Treatment P except for the payoff tables.  The payoff tables 
for Treatment S are based on the following model of a Groves mechanism with single-peaked 
preferences with two players.  Suppose that the true valuation functions of agent types 1 and 2 
are respectively vy y 1
2 12 () ( ) =− −  and vy y 2
2 17 () ( ) =− − , where y ∈ℜ+  is the level of a public 
good.  Each type reports his most preferred level of the public good called a peak.  Given a 
vector of reported peaks (~ ,~ ) rr 12, the level of the public good, yr r (~ ,~ ) 12, and the transfer to type i, 
trr i(~ ,~ ) 12, are determined by a Groves mechanism: yr r (~ ,~ ) 12 = (~~ )/ rr 122 +  and trr i(~ ,~ ) 12 = 
−+ − ((~~ )/ ~) rr r j 12
2 2,   i j j i ,, ; =≠ 12 . The payoff functions are therefore given by  
  vy rr trr 11 2 1 1 2 (( ~ ,~ )) (~ ,~ ) +  = −+ − −+ − ((~~ )/ ) ((~~ )/ ~ ) rr rr r 12
2
12 2
2 2 12 2  , 
  vy rr trr 21 2 2 1 2 (( ~ ,~ )) (~ ,~ ) +  = −+ − −+ − ((~~ )/ ) ((~~ )/ ~ ) rr rr r 12
2
12 1
2 2 17 2  .  
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Let the strategy space of each type be the set of integers from 0 to 24.   According to the above 
payoff functions, we can construct the payoff matrices of types 1 and 2. 
  The payoff tables used in Treatment S were Tables 6 and 7 whose basic structures were 
the same as those of the original payoff tables, modified as follows.  First, we changed the 
names of strategies:  strategy "0" was renamed "1", "1" was renamed "2", and so on.  Second, we 
employed a linear transformation of the payoff functions:  10 14 218 5 vi /. +  fori = 12 , . 
 
-------------------------------------------- 
Link to Tables 6 and 7
-------------------------------------------- 
 
  There is a unique dominant strategy in Tables 6 and 7: 13 for Type 1 and 18 for Type 2.  
However, note that because we discretized the possible levels in the payoff tables and rounded 
payoffs to the nearest whole number, neither player type has a strictly dominant strategy. 
Therefore, Treatments S and P cannot be differentiated in terms of strictly dominant strategies. 
However, only Treatment S involves a secure mechanism in which there is no Nash equilibrium 
other than the dominant strategy equilibrium.   
Let us consider the situation from an “evolutive” perspective. It is easy to check from the 
payoff tables that in Treatment S, any number less than 12 or greater than 14 is strictly 
dominated for player 1, while any number less than 17 or greater than 19 is strictly dominated 
for player 2. Moreover, if player 2 chooses a number between 17 and 19, then player 1’s unique 
best response is 13, while if player 1 chooses a number between 12 and 14 then player 2’s 
unique best response is 18. Therefore, in Treatment S, convergence towards (13, 18) should be 
fairly rapid. On the other hand, in Treatment P, any learning dynamics with the property that 
Nash equilibria are rest points can theoretically get “stuck” at a bad Nash equilibrium. In 
practice, convergence in Treatment P may occur but be very slow, due to the very weak 
pressure to adopt weakly dominant strategies. 
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5.2 Procedures 
The sessions in Japan and in the United States involved a variety of procedural 
differences. They were not intended to replicate the same experimental conditions, but instead 
were useful to evaluate the robustness of our findings to different subject pools and procedures. 
Most notably, the sessions in Japan were run “by hand” with pen and paper, and the sessions in 
the U.S. were computerized using zTree (Fischbacher, 1999). If we had observed significant 
differences across experiment sites, then we would not be able to identify the source of those 
differences without further experimentation. Fortunately, the data do not indicate any 
meaningful statistically significant differences across sites within either mechanism treatment.10  
In the Japan sessions the twenty subjects were seated at desks in a relatively large room 
and had identification numbers assigned randomly.  These ID numbers were not publicly 
displayed, however, so subjects could not determine who had which number.  In the U.S. 
sessions the twenty subjects were seated at computer stations in the Vernon Smith Experimental 
Economics Laboratory that were separated with visual partitions.  In every period, each of the 
type 1 subjects was paired with one of the type 2 subjects.  The pairings were determined in 
advance by experimenters so as not to pair the same two subjects more than once (“strangers”).  
Each subject received written instructions, a record sheet, a payoff table, and (in the Japan 
sessions only) information transmission sheets.  Instructions were also given by tape recorder in 
Japan and were read aloud by the experimenter in the U.S.11  Each subject chose her number 
from an integer between 1 and 25 by looking at her own payoff table only.12  No subject knew 
the payoff table of the other type.  Moreover, we provided no explanation regarding the rules of 
the mechanisms or how the payoff tables were constructed.      
                                                      
10 A detailed statistical analysis comparing the Japanese and American sessions results is available from the authors 
upon request. 
11 The experiment instructions are available from the authors upon request. 
12 We required subjects to examine their payoff table for ten minutes before we began the real periods.  
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After deciding which number she chose, each subject marked the number on an 
information transmission sheet (Japan) or typed in her number on her computer (U.S.).  
Experimenters collected these information transmission sheets and then redistributed them to 
the paired subjects in Japan. The computer network handled the message transmission in the 
U.S.  Each period, subjects in both countries were asked to fill out the reasons why they chose 
these numbers.  After learning the paired subject’s choice, subjects calculated their payoffs from 
the payoff tables (Japan) or verified the computer-calculated payoffs (U.S.). Record sheets were 
identical (except for the language translation, of course) at the two sites.  These steps were 
repeated for eight periods in Japan and for ten periods in the U.S. Recall that subjects were 
never paired together for more than one period. 
In the Japan sessions the mean payoff per subject was 1677 yen in Treatment S and it 
was 1669 yen in Treatment P. In the U.S. sessions the mean payoff per subject was $21.04 in 
Treatment S and it was $20.35 in Treatment P. 
Even though each subject can see only her own payoff table, the repeated play allows 
learning to take place. A Nash equilibrium can be interpreted as a rest point of the dynamic 
learning process (Hurwicz, 1972; Smith, 2002), which is one justification for our interest in 
secure implementation. 13  
 
6.  Results 
6.1 Treatment P        
Since each period had 20 pairs of players and each session had 8 or 10 periods, we have 
180 pairs of data.  Denote each pair by ( , ) xx 12  where xi  is a number chosen by a subject of 
                                                      
13 The theoretical prediction can be interesting even in a one-shot game. In fact, another justification for secure 
implementation is that, for any possible prior beliefs about types that the players could have, secure mechanisms 
have the property that any Bayesian Nash equilibrium outcome is socially optimal. We thank an anonymous referee 
for prompting us to think about these issues.  
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type i, i = 1, 2.  Figure 4 shows the frequency distribution of all data in Treatment P.  The 
maximum frequency pair was (16, 12) with 34 pairs, the second was (16, 13) with 27 pairs, the 
third was (17, 13) with 19 pairs, and the fourth was (17, 12) with 10 pairs.  The total frequency of 
the four dominant strategy equilibria (16,12), (16,13), (17,12), and (17,13) was 90—exactly one-
half of the outcomes.14 Sixty-one other outcomes were Nash equilibria other than dominant 
strategy equilibria. The total frequency of Nash equilibria including dominant strategy 
equilibria was 151. Although nearly half (298/621) of the possible strategy pairs shown in Table 
3 that are not dominant strategy equilibrium outcomes are not Nash equilibria, only about one-
third (29/90) of the observed non-dominant-strategy outcomes were not Nash equilibria. This 
suggests that deviations from the dominant strategy equilibria are not random, but are instead 
more likely to correspond to Nash equilibria. The frequency of bad outcomes was 30.15  Only 
one pair in one period played a bad Nash equilibrium. All other Nash equilibrium outcomes 
were good. Why were almost all Nash equilibria good? To see the reason, suppose that a type 1 
subject succeeds in discovering a dominant strategy, say 16, but a type 2 subject fails to find a 
dominant strategy. Even then a good Nash equilibrium is achieved as long as the type 2 subject 
chooses a best response to the type 1’s strategy (her best response to 16 is to choose an integer 
more than or equal to 12). It would be much easier to find a best response to a given strategy 
than a dominant strategy. Therefore, if at least one of two subjects find a dominant strategy, 
then the outcome is likely to lie in the region of good Nash equilibria containing dominant 
                                                      
14 Notice that the dominant strategy equilibria (16, 12) and (16, 13) are Pareto-dominated by the dominant strategy 
equilibria (17, 12) and (17, 13). The frequency of Pareto-dominated dominant strategy equilibria (16,12) and (16,13) 
was 61, while the frequency of the dominant strategy equilibria (17,12) and (17,13) was 29. Seventy-two percent of the 
dominant strategies played by Type 1 subjects were 16 rather than 17, even though these two strategies provide 
identical payoffs. The greater frequency of 16 declines in later periods, however, and only in periods 1 and 3 is 16 
significantly more frequent than 17 at the 5-percent level (two-tailed) according to a binomial test. Recall that each 
subject chose her number by looking at her own payoff table only, without knowing the payoff table of the other 
subject. Therefore, it was not possible for a type 1 subject to know that choosing 16 gives a type 2 subject a worse 
payoff than choosing 17, that is, choosing 16 leads to Pareto dominated equilibria. We think type 1 subjects merely 
happened to choose 16 more frequently in this experiment, without realizing that choosing 16 could result in Pareto 
dominated outcomes.  
15 Because of our linear transformation of payoff functions and renaming of strategies, the areas of good and bad 
outcomes in Table 3 become as follows: the outcome is good if the sum of two types’ numbers is greater than or equal 
to 28; otherwise, it is bad.   
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strategy equilibria. Table 8 of overall data frequency shows this happened in Treatment P. 
Indeed, 88% (=151/171) of type 1 subjects’ choices were their best responses when type 2 
subjects chose dominant strategies and 97% (=166/171) of type 2 subjects’ choices were their 
best responses when type 1 subjects selected dominant strategies.  
 
---------------------------------------------------- 
Links to Figure 4 AND Table 8
-------------------------------------------------- 
  We conducted period by period tests of the hypothesis that the median choice is equal to 
a dominant strategy (16 or 17 for type 1 and 12 or 13 for type 2).  A nonparametric Wilcoxon 
signed rank test rejects the hypothesis that type 1 subjects’ median choice equals the dominant 
strategy of 17 in five out of ten periods (periods 1, 2, 3, 7 and 8), but this test never rejects the 
null hypothesis that the median choice corresponds to the dominant strategy of 16 (two-tailed 
test, five-percent significance level).  Similarly, this nonparametric test rejects the hypothesis 
that type 2 subjects’ median choice equals the dominant strategy of 12 in eight out of ten 
periods (periods 1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 7, 8 and 9), but this test never rejects the null hypothesis that the 
median choice corresponds to the dominant strategy of 13.16  
  These Treatment P results lead to the following observations: 
 
Observation 1: 
(a) The frequency of dominant strategy equilibria was 50% across all periods in Treatment P. 
 (b) The data do not reject the hypothesis that subjects’ median choice is a dominant strategy for either 
type in any period in Treatment P. 
(c) The frequency of Nash equilibria was 84% across all periods in Treatment P. 68% of the observed non-
dominant-strategy outcomes were Nash equilibria. 
                                                      
16 The key advantage of the Wilcoxon test is that it does not require any assumptions regarding the probability 
distribution underlying the data. The test does, however, assume that the observations are statistically independent. 
This assumption is satisfied exactly in period 1, and is satisfied approximately in the later periods because each 
observation used in each test is generated by a different individual. Subjects in the same session interact in earlier 
periods, however, which make their later period choices not strictly independent.  
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(d) The frequency of bad outcomes that did not recommend funding of the public good was 17% across all 
periods in Treatment P. Almost all (98%) of the observed Nash equilibria that involved dominated 
strategies were good Nash equilibria that recommended funding of the public good. 
 
6.2 Treatment S        
  Figure 5 shows the frequency distribution of all data in Treatment S.   The maximum 
frequency pair was the dominant strategy equilibrium (13, 18) with 146 of the 180 outcomes. 
Pairs played no other single outcome more than 4 times.      
 
-------------------------------- 
Link to Figure 5
-------------------------------- 
  We conducted period by period tests of the hypothesis that the median choice equals the 
dominant strategy (13 for type 1 and 18 for type 2).  A Wilcoxon signed rank test never rejects 
the dominant strategy equilibrium hypothesis for any type in any period. 
  Summarizing the above results, we have the following: 
 
Observation 2: 
(a) The frequency of dominant strategy equilibrium was 81% across all periods in Treatment S.   
(b) The data do not reject the hypothesis that subjects' median choice equals the dominant strategy for 
either type in any period in Treatment S. 
  
6.3  Comparing the Two Mechanisms 
  Here we compare the frequency that subjects play dominant strategies and that pairs 
implement dominant strategy equilibria in the two mechanisms. Recall that an advantage of our 
experimental design is that we can compare these two mechanisms while holding constant their 
complexity. We did not present to subjects any explanation on the rules of a mechanism, and 
instead we simply used payoff tables to explain the relationship between choices and outcomes.  
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This is likely to have reduced the confusion experienced by subjects when deciding upon which 
strategies to play, although it is unlikely to have eliminated confusion completely. 
  Figure 6 displays the rates that subjects play dominant strategies separately for all 
periods. Individuals are more likely to play dominant strategies in Treatment S than in 
Treatment P according to Fisher’s exact test in 7 out of 10 periods (periods 2, 6, 7, 8 and 9 at the 
5% significance level, and periods 4 and 5 at the 10% significance level).17 Notice that 
differences are not significant in most early periods, suggesting that confusion may have 
influenced behavior initially while subjects learned how their choices affected their earnings. A 
more powerful parametric test is possible by pooling the data across periods. Since individual 
subjects contribute an observation for each period, the multiple observations generated by 
individuals are not independent and it is appropriate to model the panel nature of the data. We 
do this with a subject random effect specification for the error term εit = ui + vit, where ui 
represents the idiosyncratic error for subject i and vit is iid.18 Column 1 of Table 9 reports a 
probit model of the likelihood that the subject selects a dominant strategy. The positive and 
significant dummy variable for the mechanism treatment indicates that subjects are more likely 
to play a dominant strategy in the secure mechanism.19 
                                                      
17 As discussed in the previous footnote for the Wilcoxon test, Fisher’s exact test also requires statistically-
independent observations. This holds strictly only in the first period, since subjects in the same session interact in 
earlier periods. Our design features multiple periods of decisions, as in the most other experiments, because we are 
interested in decisions when subjects have some experience in order to test equilibrium predictions. This has the 
drawback of clouding the interpretation of some nonparametric statistical tests due to imperfect statistical 
independence. But additional parametric tests, such as those shown in Table 9, explicitly accounts for the 
dependence in the errors and can provide robustness checks on our conclusions. 
18 Session rather than subject random effects provide similar results, also with highly significant estimated 
mechanism treatment effects (dummy treatment variable estimate = 0.644, p-value < 0.01). We also estimated this 
probit model with clustering at the session level and obtained a similar treatment dummy estimate (0.643) that is also 
highly significant (p-value < 0.01). As a further robustness check we also estimated this model with clustering at the 
subject level and also find a significant treatment effect (p-value < 0.01). 
19 Recall that subjects also indicated the reasons for their choices on their record sheets and in a post-experiment 
questionnaire. These responses provide an additional (noisy) source of data revealing subjects’ motivations. We 
reviewed their responses and found that more individual subjects provided explanations that were clearly 
identifiable as dominant strategy arguments (e.g., “This is the highest payoff column no matter what the other person 
chooses.”) in Treatment S (23 individuals) than in Treatment P (13 individuals). This difference is statistically  
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--------------------------------------------------- 
Links to Figure 6 AND Table 9
--------------------------------------------------- 
 
  Figure 7 shows that the differences in the individual dominant strategy rates are 
magnified for the pair rates. Pairs are more likely to play a dominant strategy equilibrium in 
Treatment S according to Fisher’s exact test in 8 out of 10 periods (periods 2, 4, 6, 7, 8 and 9 at 
the 5% significance level, and periods 3 and 5 at the 10% significance level). Column 2 of Table 9 
reports a probit model of the likelihood that pairs play a dominant strategy equilibrium, 
pooling across periods. A random subject effect specification is not possible since the 
composition of the individuals in each pair changes each period. But we include a dummy 
variable for the Purdue sessions to capture any (fixed effect) differences across sessions, and we 
report robust standard errors that account for clustering at the session level. This accounts 
directly for the fact that observations are independent across sessions but not within sessions. 
The mechanism treatment dummy variable is highly significant, indicating the substantially 
greater frequency of dominant strategy equilibrium play in Treatment S. Recall that neither 
Treatment S nor Treatment P have strictly dominant strategies, but only Treatment S involves a 
secure mechanism. 
-------------------------------- 
Link to Figure 7
-------------------------------- 
  Summarizing the above results, we have the following: 
 
Observation 3: 
                                                                                                                                                                           
significant according to Fisher’s exact test (p-value=0.021). Of course, asking for subjects’ reasoning could have 
influenced results, a conjecture that we cannot address with our data because we elicited these responses in all 
sessions. The only choice made by subjects before articulating their motivation was the period 1 choice, but as 
already noted we suspect that at least some subjects may have been confused when making their initial decision, and 
this makes the comparison of period 1 choices with later choices confounded by learning.  
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(a) Individuals play dominant strategies significantly more frequently in Treatment S than in Treatment 
P. 
(b) Pairs implement dominant strategy equilibria significantly more frequently in Treatment S than in 
Treatment P. 
 
6.4 Is the Pivotal Mechanism for Nash Implementation? 
  Figure 7 also illustrates the frequency of Nash equilibrium play at each period for 
Treatment P. The Nash equilibrium rate increased and became close to one as rounds advanced, 
while the dominant strategy equilibrium rate was around 50% across all periods in Treatment P. 
Thus, the concept of Nash equilibrium predicted long-run behavior much better than the 
concept of dominant strategies. Moreover, almost all Nash equilibria that were played were 
good, so in Treatment P the pivotal mechanism can be said to have succeeded in Nash 
implementing the socially efficient outcome. 
Our findings contrast with those in Kawagoe and Mori’s (2001) experiment on the 
pivotal mechanism with five agents. They conducted two different treatments, depending on 
whether or not payoff tables were given to subjects. First, when only the rule of the pivotal 
mechanism was explained, but no payoff table was used, the rate that individual subjects play 
dominant strategies was 16% (= 31/200), the frequency of dominant strategy equilibria was 0% 
(= 0/40), the frequency of Nash equilibria was 63% (=25/40), the frequency of bad outcomes 
was 45% (=18/40), and 44% (=11/25) of Nash equilibrium outcomes were bad. Therefore, the 
pivotal mechanism failed to achieve Nash implementation without using any payoff table. 
On the other hand, when payoff tables were given to subjects in addition to an 
explanation of the rule, the individual dominant strategy play rate as well as the frequency of 
good Nash equilibria increased. The rate that individual subjects play dominant strategies 
became 47% (= 47/100), although the frequency of dominant strategy equilibria was only 5% (=  
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1/20). The frequency of Nash equilibria was 65% (=13/20), the frequency of bad outcomes was 
10% (=2/20), and all Nash equilibrium outcomes were good, which is similar to our result. 
Notice that about two-thirds of the observed non-dominant strategy outcomes were 
Nash equilibria regardless of whether payoff tables were used. That is, deviations from 
dominant strategy equilibria tended to correspond to Nash equilibria in Kawagoe and Mori’s 
experiment, too. In itself, this provides some justification for looking at secure mechanisms. 
But whether the Nash equilibria that involved dominated strategies resulted in good or 
bad outcomes seemed to depend on whether or not payoff tables were employed. The reason 
why all Nash equilibria were good with payoff tables seems to be similar to that why almost all 
Nash equilibria were good in Treatment P, discussed in Section 6.1. If some, but not necessarily 
all, subjects succeed in discovering dominant strategies and the others choose best responses, 
then the outcome is likely to lie in the region of good Nash equilibria containing dominant 
strategy equilibria. The use of payoff tables would help subjects to find dominant strategies and 
best responses more easily. Of course further study is needed to investigate how much 
information on payoff structures is necessary for subjects to discover dominant strategies or 
play good Nash equilibria in the pivotal mechanism. This is left for future research. 
 
7. Conclusion 
Recent experimental and theoretical findings have raised serious questions about the 
viability of dominant strategy mechanisms. A possible solution is the notion of secure 
implementation introduced in Saijo, Sjöström and Yamato (2003). Motivated by this theoretical 
concept this paper presents an experimental study of the pivotal mechanism and a Groves-
Clarke mechanism with single-peaked preferences.  Both mechanisms are strategy-proof. But  
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the pivotal mechanism has Nash equilibria that differ from the dominant strategy equilibria, 
and players adopted dominant strategies significantly less often in the pivotal mechanism. 
  The purpose of this paper is a fairly limited one: we wanted to compare the performance 
of secure and non-secure mechanisms in an idealized laboratory experiment with a high signal-
to-noise ratio. Accordingly, we have tried to minimize "noise" due to subject confusion about 
the payoffs. This is done by describing the payoffs as clearly as possible using payoff tables. In 
such an idealized environment, we find that replacing a non-secure by a secure mechanism 
significantly increases the likelihood that the players will use their dominant strategies. Indeed, 
in the non-secure pivotal mechanism the players failed to use their dominant strategies about 
half of the time. Deviations from dominant strategies were also systematic rather than random: 
they corresponded to Nash equilibria. Although almost all Nash equilibria were “good” in our 
experiment (which used payoff tables only), many Nash equilibria were “bad” in Kawagoe and 
Mori’s (2001) experiment when no payoff table was employed. The performance of the non-
secure mechanism may be unstable, depending on how information on payoff structures is 
given to subjects.  In contrast, we are optimistic about the performance of secure mechanisms, 
where “bad” Nash equilibria are non-existent.  
We believe these findings may have implications for practical applications. Of course, a 
real world application would typically be "noisier" than our laboratory experiment, so the 
performance of both secure and non-secure mechanisms could be worse than in our idealized 
situation. But we this it is unlikely that noise would eliminate all potential problems caused by 
multiple Nash equilibria. Thus, we conjecture that, whatever the environment, secure 
mechanisms are likely to do better. In particular, we would not be surprised to find that non-
secure mechanisms perform poorly in practice, because the players fail to use their dominant 
strategies even in our idealized laboratory environment. Therefore, if the non-secure 
mechanism fails in a practical application, this cannot be simply attributed to confusion due to 
the presentation of payoffs. Of course, using a secure mechanism in a practical application 
would not guarantee good absolute performance either (although it would probably do  
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relatively better than a non-secure one). In a real world application, the subjects may become 
confused about the rules of the game and the payoffs. We leave for the future the task of 
studying how noise can be minimized in practical applications. But we believe that overly 
pessimistic conclusions about the future of mechanism design, which some researchers have 
drawn based on the poor performance of non-secure mechanisms in laboratory experiments, 
may not be justified at this point. Our experiment suggests that there is no inherent flaw in the 
game theoretic predictions that would rule out all possible practical applications.20 
In practical applications, mechanisms should not be too complex, due to the finite 
information processing capacity of the players. It turns out that requiring secure 
implementation does not lead to more complex mechanisms:  attention can be restricted to 
revelation mechanisms without loss of generality (Saijo, Sjöström and Yamato, 2003). By 
Proposition 1, the efficiency condition and strategy-proofness essentially pin down the 
revelation mechanism in the public goods environment. In order to compare the performance of 
two efficient strategy-proof revelation mechanisms, one that is secure and one that is not, the 
environment (specifically, the set of valuation functions) has to vary across treatments (as in 
Treatment P versus Treatment  S). In our experiment, we do not think this matters too much, 
because the presentation of the payoff tables was similar in the two treatments. Still, in other 
situations it may be possible to make interesting comparisons of the performance of secure 
versus non-secure mechanisms in the same environment. This is left for future experiments. 
Recently, Chen (2005) and Chen and Gazzale (2004) study whether mechanisms based 
on supermodularity conditions achieve convergence to Nash equilibria through learning. They 
find supermodular mechanisms converge significantly better than non-supermodular 
mechanisms in experiments.  It would be interesting to investigate the role of supermodularity 
in accomplishing convergence to dominant strategy equilibria.  It is easy to check that 
                                                      
20 In contrast, if the secure mechanism had performed poorly in our experiment, this would have suggested that, no 
matter how well the mechanism could be explained to the participants, practical applications of mechanism design 
would have little hope of success.  
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Treatment S is both secure and supermodular, while Treatment P is neither secure nor 
supermodular.  Therefore, it is not clear from the current analysis which condition, security or 
supermodularity, is more important for dominant strategy play. In Cason, Saijo, Wakayama, 
and Yamato (2004), however, we observe that individuals’ rate of dominant strategy play is 
high in a secure but non-supermodular mechanism experiment. These initial results suggest 
that supermodularity may not be necessary in order to generate dominant strategy play. 
The points we have raised concerning bad Nash equilibria apply equally well to bad 
Bayesian-Nash equilibria in an incomplete information setting. If a social choice function is 
securely implemented, then it can be shown that all Bayesian-Nash equilibria are “good”, no 
matter what the prior distribution over types may be.   We believe that this point is relevant for 
practical mechanism design. For example, for certain prior distributions, the second-price 
(Vickrey) auction has “bad” Bayesian-Nash equilibria that yield different outcomes than the 
(efficient) dominant strategy, truth-telling equilibrium. Most proponents of this auction 
institution have not acknowledged this shortcoming. Before making predictions regarding how 
this institution might perform in the field, it would be valuable to conduct laboratory 
experiments with the information conditions that admit these other inefficient Bayesian-Nash 
equilibria. We suspect that the second price auction and many other strategy-proof mechanisms 
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Figure 3: Payoff function of a Groves Mechanism 











































































































































































































The number which you choose (Type 1)
123456789 1 0 1 1 1 2 1 3 1 4 1 5 1 6 1 7 1 8 1 9 2 0 2 1 2 2 2 3 2 4 2 5
1 294 294 294 294 294 294 294 294 294 294 294 294 294 294 294 294 294 294 294 294 294 294 294 294 294
2 294 294 294 294 294 294 294 294 294 294 294 294 294 294 294 294 294 294 294 294 294 294 294 294 294
3 294 294 294 294 294 294 294 294 294 294 294 294 294 294 294 294 294 294 294 294 294 294 294 294 182
4 294 294 294 294 294 294 294 294 294 294 294 294 294 294 294 294 294 294 294 294 294 294 294 196 196
5 294 294 294 294 294 294 294 294 294 294 294 294 294 294 294 294 294 294 294 294 294 294 210 210 210
6 280 280 280 280 280 280 280 280 280 280 280 280 280 280 280 280 280 280 280 280 280 210 210 210 210
The number  7 266 266 266 266 266 266 266 266 266 266 266 266 266 266 266 266 266 266 266 266 210 210 210 210 210
which the  8 252 252 252 252 252 252 252 252 252 252 252 252 252 252 252 252 252 252 252 210 210 210 210 210 210
other person 9 238 238 238 238 238 238 238 238 238 238 238 238 238 238 238 238 238 238 210 210 210 210 210 210 210
chooses 10 224 224 224 224 224 224 224 224 224 224 224 224 224 224 224 224 224 210 210 210 210 210 210 210 210
(Type 2) 11 210 210 210 210 210 210 210 210 210 210 210 210 210 210 210 210 210 210 210 210 210 210 210 210 210
12 196 196 196 196 196 196 196 196 196 196 196 196 196 196 196 210 210 210 210 210 210 210 210 210 210
13 182 182 182 182 182 182 182 182 182 182 182 182 182 182 210 210 210 210 210 210 210 210 210 210 210
14 168 168 168 168 168 168 168 168 168 168 168 168 168 210 210 210 210 210 210 210 210 210 210 210 210
15 154 154 154 154 154 154 154 154 154 154 154 154 210 210 210 210 210 210 210 210 210 210 210 210 210
16 140 140 140 140 140 140 140 140 140 140 140 210 210 210 210 210 210 210 210 210 210 210 210 210 210
17 126 126 126 126 126 126 126 126 126 126 210 210 210 210 210 210 210 210 210 210 210 210 210 210 210
18 112 112 112 112 112 112 112 112 112 210 210 210 210 210 210 210 210 210 210 210 210 210 210 210 210
19 98 98 98 98 98 98 98 98 210 210 210 210 210 210 210 210 210 210 210 210 210 210 210 210 210
20 84 84 84 84 84 84 84 210 210 210 210 210 210 210 210 210 210 210 210 210 210 210 210 210 210
21 70 70 70 70 70 70 210 210 210 210 210 210 210 210 210 210 210 210 210 210 210 210 210 210 210
22 56 56 56 56 56 210 210 210 210 210 210 210 210 210 210 210 210 210 210 210 210 210 210 210 210
23 42 42 42 42 210 210 210 210 210 210 210 210 210 210 210 210 210 210 210 210 210 210 210 210 210
24 28 28 28 210 210 210 210 210 210 210 210 210 210 210 210 210 210 210 210 210 210 210 210 210 210
25 14 14 210 210 210 210 210 210 210 210 210 210 210 210 210 210 210 210 210 210 210 210 210 210 210
Table 1. Payoff Table of Type 1 in Treatment P.P2
The number which you choose (Type 2)
123456789 1 0 1 1 1 2 1 3 1 4 1 5 1 6 1 7 1 8 1 9 2 0 2 1 2 2 2 3 2 4 2 5
1 182 182 182 182 182 182 182 182 182 182 182 182 182 182 182 182 182 182 182 182 182 182 182 182 182
2 182 182 182 182 182 182 182 182 182 182 182 182 182 182 182 182 182 182 182 182 182 182 182 182 182
3 182 182 182 182 182 182 182 182 182 182 182 182 182 182 182 182 182 182 182 182 182 182 182 182 14
4 182 182 182 182 182 182 182 182 182 182 182 182 182 182 182 182 182 182 182 182 182 182 182 28 28
5 182 182 182 182 182 182 182 182 182 182 182 182 182 182 182 182 182 182 182 182 182 182 42 42 42
6 182 182 182 182 182 182 182 182 182 182 182 182 182 182 182 182 182 182 182 182 182 56 56 56 56
The number  7 182 182 182 182 182 182 182 182 182 182 182 182 182 182 182 182 182 182 182 182 70 70 70 70 70
which the  8 182 182 182 182 182 182 182 182 182 182 182 182 182 182 182 182 182 182 182 84 84 84 84 84 84
other person 9 182 182 182 182 182 182 182 182 182 182 182 182 182 182 182 182 182 182 98 98 98 98 98 98 98
chooses 10 182 182 182 182 182 182 182 182 182 182 182 182 182 182 182 182 182 112 112 112 112 112 112 112 112
(Type 1) 11 182 182 182 182 182 182 182 182 182 182 182 182 182 182 182 182 126 126 126 126 126 126 126 126 126
12 182 182 182 182 182 182 182 182 182 182 182 182 182 182 182 140 140 140 140 140 140 140 140 140 140
13 182 182 182 182 182 182 182 182 182 182 182 182 182 182 154 154 154 154 154 154 154 154 154 154 154
14 182 182 182 182 182 182 182 182 182 182 182 182 182 168 168 168 168 168 168 168 168 168 168 168 168
15 182 182 182 182 182 182 182 182 182 182 182 182 182 182 182 182 182 182 182 182 182 182 182 182 182
16 182 182 182 182 182 182 182 182 182 182 182 196 196 196 196 196 196 196 196 196 196 196 196 196 196
17 182 182 182 182 182 182 182 182 182 182 210 210 210 210 210 210 210 210 210 210 210 210 210 210 210
18 182 182 182 182 182 182 182 182 182 224 224 224 224 224 224 224 224 224 224 224 224 224 224 224 224
19 182 182 182 182 182 182 182 182 238 238 238 238 238 238 238 238 238 238 238 238 238 238 238 238 238
20 182 182 182 182 182 182 182 252 252 252 252 252 252 252 252 252 252 252 252 252 252 252 252 252 252
21 182 182 182 182 182 182 266 266 266 266 266 266 266 266 266 266 266 266 266 266 266 266 266 266 266
22 182 182 182 182 182 280 280 280 280 280 280 280 280 280 280 280 280 280 280 280 280 280 280 280 280
23 182 182 182 182 294 294 294 294 294 294 294 294 294 294 294 294 294 294 294 294 294 294 294 294 294
24 168 168 168 294 294 294 294 294 294 294 294 294 294 294 294 294 294 294 294 294 294 294 294 294 294
25 154 154 294 294 294 294 294 294 294 294 294 294 294 294 294 294 294 294 294 294 294 294 294 294 294
Table 2. Payoff Table of Type 2 in Treatment P.  Dominant Strategy Equilibrium   Good Nash Equilibrium
  Bad Nash Equilibrium
Type 2's number
123456789 1 0 1 1 1 2 1 3 1 4 1 5 1 6 1 7 1 8 1 9 2 0 2 1 2 2 2 3 2 4 2 5
1 294, 182 294, 182 294, 182 294, 182 294, 182 280, 182 266, 182 252, 182 238, 182 224, 182 210, 182 196, 182 182, 182 168, 182 154, 182 140, 182 126, 182 112, 182 98, 182 84, 182 70, 182 56, 182 42, 182 28, 182 14, 182
2 294, 182 294, 182 294, 182 294, 182 294, 182 280, 182 266, 182 252, 182 238, 182 224, 182 210, 182 196, 182 182, 182 168, 182 154, 182 140, 182 126, 182 112, 182 98, 182 84, 182 70, 182 56, 182 42, 182 28, 182 14, 182
3 294, 182 294, 182 294, 182 294, 182 294, 182 280, 182 266, 182 252, 182 238, 182 224, 182 210, 182 196, 182 182, 182 168, 182 154, 182 140, 182 126, 182 112, 182 98, 182 84, 182 70, 182 56, 182 42, 182 28, 182 210, 14
4 294, 182 294, 182 294, 182 294, 182 294, 182 280, 182 266, 182 252, 182 238, 182 224, 182 210, 182 196, 182 182, 182 168, 182 154, 182 140, 182 126, 182 112, 182 98, 182 84, 182 70, 182 56, 182 42, 182 210, 28 210, 28
5 294, 182 294, 182 294, 182 294, 182 294, 182 280, 182 266, 182 252, 182 238, 182 224, 182 210, 182 196, 182 182, 182 168, 182 154, 182 140, 182 126, 182 112, 182 98, 182 84, 182 70, 182 56, 182 210, 42 210, 42 210, 42
6 294, 182 294, 182 294, 182 294, 182 294, 182 280, 182 266, 182 252, 182 238, 182 224, 182 210, 182 196, 182 182, 182 168, 182 154, 182 140, 182 126, 182 112, 182 98, 182 84, 182 70, 182 210, 56 210, 56 210, 56 210, 56
7 294, 182 294, 182 294, 182 294, 182 294, 182 280, 182 266, 182 252, 182 238, 182 224, 182 210, 182 196, 182 182, 182 168, 182 154, 182 140, 182 126, 182 112, 182 98, 182 84, 182 210, 70 210, 70 210, 70 210, 70 210, 70
Type 1's 
8 294, 182 294, 182 294, 182 294, 182 294, 182 280, 182 266, 182 252, 182 238, 182 224, 182 210, 182 196, 182 182, 182 168, 182 154, 182 140, 182 126, 182 112, 182 98, 182 84, 182 210, 84 210, 84 210, 84 210, 84 210, 84
number
9 294, 182 294, 182 294, 182 294, 182 294, 182 280, 182 266, 182 252, 182 238, 182 224, 182 210, 182 196, 182 182, 182 168, 182 154, 182 140, 182 126, 182 112, 182 210, 98 210, 98 210, 98 210, 98 210, 98 210, 98 210, 98
10 294, 182 294, 182 294, 182 294, 182 294, 182 280, 182 266, 182 252, 182 238, 182 224, 182 210, 182 196, 182 182, 182 168, 182 154, 182 140, 182 126, 182 210, 112 210, 112 210, 112 210, 112 210, 112 210, 112 210, 112 210, 112
11 294, 182 294, 182 294, 182 294, 182 294, 182 280, 182 266, 182 252, 182 238, 182 224, 182 210, 182 196, 182 182, 182 168, 182 154, 182 140, 182 210, 126 210, 126 210, 126 210, 126 210, 126 210, 126 210, 126 210, 126 210, 126
12 294, 182 294, 182 294, 182 294, 182 294, 182 280, 182 266, 182 252, 182 238, 182 224, 182 210, 182 196, 182 182, 182 168, 182 154, 182 210, 140 210, 140 210, 140 210, 140 210, 140 210, 140 210, 140 210, 140 210, 140 210, 140
13 294, 182 294, 182 294, 182 294, 182 294, 182 280, 182 266, 182 252, 182 238, 182 224, 182 210, 182 196, 182 182, 182 168, 182 210, 154 210, 154 210, 154 210, 154 210, 154 210, 154 210, 154 210, 154 210, 154 210, 154 210, 154
14 294, 182 294, 182 294, 182 294, 182 294, 182 280, 182 266, 182 252, 182 238, 182 224, 182 210, 182 196, 182 182, 182 210, 168 210, 168 210, 168 210, 168 210, 168 210, 168 210, 168 210, 168 210, 168 210, 168 210, 168 210, 168
15 294, 182 294, 182 294, 182 294, 182 294, 182 280, 182 266, 182 252, 182 238, 182 224, 182 210, 182 196, 182 210, 182 210, 182 210, 182 210, 182 210, 182 210, 182 210, 182 210, 182 210, 182 210, 182 210, 182 210, 182 210, 182
16 294, 182 294, 182 294, 182 294, 182 294, 182 280, 182 266, 182 252, 182 238, 182 224, 182 210, 182 210, 196 210, 196 210, 196 210, 196 210, 196 210, 196 210, 196 210, 196 210, 196 210, 196 210, 196 210, 196 210, 196 210, 196
17 294, 182 294, 182 294, 182 294, 182 294, 182 280, 182 266, 182 252, 182 238, 182 224, 182 210, 210 210, 210 210, 210 210, 210 210, 210 210, 210 210, 210 210, 210 210, 210 210, 210 210, 210 210, 210 210, 210 210, 210 210, 210
18 294, 182 294, 182 294, 182 294, 182 294, 182 280, 182 266, 182 252, 182 238, 182 210, 244 210, 244 210, 244 210, 244 210, 244 210, 244 210, 244 210, 244 210, 244 210, 244 210, 244 210, 244 210, 244 210, 244 210, 244 210, 244
19 294, 182 294, 182 294, 182 294, 182 294, 182 280, 182 266, 182 252, 182 210, 238 210, 238 210, 238 210, 238 210, 238 210, 238 210, 238 210, 238 210, 238 210, 238 210, 238 210, 238 210, 238 210, 238 210, 238 210, 238 210, 238
20 294, 182 294, 182 294, 182 294, 182 294, 182 280, 182 266, 182 210, 252 210, 252 210, 252 210, 252 210, 252 210, 252 210, 252 210, 252 210, 252 210, 252 210, 252 210, 252 210, 252 210, 252 210, 252 210, 252 210, 252 210, 252
21 294, 182 294, 182 294, 182 294, 182 294, 182 280, 182 210, 266 210, 266 210, 266 210, 266 210, 266 210, 266 210, 266 210, 266 210, 266 210, 266 210, 266 210, 266 210, 266 210, 266 210, 266 210, 266 210, 266 210, 266 210, 266
22 294, 182 294, 182 294, 182 294, 182 294, 182 210, 280 210, 280 210, 280 210, 280 210, 280 210, 280 210, 280 210, 280 210, 280 210, 280 210, 280 210, 280 210, 280 210, 280 210, 280 210, 280 210, 280 210, 280 210, 280 210, 280
23 294, 182 294, 182 294, 182 294, 182 210, 294 210, 294 210, 294 210, 294 210, 294 210, 294 210, 294 210, 294 210, 294 210, 294 210, 294 210, 294 210, 294 210, 294 210, 294 210, 294 210, 294 210, 294 210, 294 210, 294 210, 294
24 294, 168 294, 168 294, 168 196, 294 210, 294 210, 294 210, 294 210, 294 210, 294 210, 294 210, 294 210, 294 210, 294 210, 294 210, 294 210, 294 210, 294 210, 294 210, 294 210, 294 210, 294 210, 294 210, 294 210, 294 210, 294
25 294, 154 294, 154 182, 294 196, 294 210, 294 210, 294 210, 294 210, 294 210, 294 210, 294 210, 294 210, 294 210, 294 210, 294 210, 294 210, 294 210, 294 210, 294 210, 294 210, 294 210, 294 210, 294 210, 294 210, 294 210, 294
Table 3.  Dominant Strategy Equilibria and Nash Equilibria in Treatment P.Type 2
51 2
8 (294, 182) (194, 182) Type 1
17 (294, 182) (210, 210)
Table 4.  The payoff table when type 1 chooses 8 or 17
and type 2 chooses 5 or 12 in Treatment P.  Dominant Strategy Equilibrium   Good Nash Equilibrium Outcomes Pareto-dominated by Dominanat 
  Pareto Efficient Outcome   Bad Nash Equilibrium  Strategy Equilibrium Outcomes
Type 2's number
123456789 1 0 1 1 1 2 1 3 1 4 1 5 1 6 1 7 1 8 1 9 2 0 2 1 2 2 2 3 2 4 2 5
1 294, 182 294, 182 294, 182 294, 182 294, 182 280, 182 266, 182 252, 182 238, 182 224, 182 210, 182 196, 182 182, 182 168, 182 154, 182 140, 182 126, 182 112, 182 98, 182 84, 182 70, 182 56, 182 42, 182 28, 182 14, 182
2 294, 182 294, 182 294, 182 294, 182 294, 182 280, 182 266, 182 252, 182 238, 182 224, 182 210, 182 196, 182 182, 182 168, 182 154, 182 140, 182 126, 182 112, 182 98, 182 84, 182 70, 182 56, 182 42, 182 28, 182 14, 182
3 294, 182 294, 182 294, 182 294, 182 294, 182 280, 182 266, 182 252, 182 238, 182 224, 182 210, 182 196, 182 182, 182 168, 182 154, 182 140, 182 126, 182 112, 182 98, 182 84, 182 70, 182 56, 182 42, 182 28, 182 210, 14
4 294, 182 294, 182 294, 182 294, 182 294, 182 280, 182 266, 182 252, 182 238, 182 224, 182 210, 182 196, 182 182, 182 168, 182 154, 182 140, 182 126, 182 112, 182 98, 182 84, 182 70, 182 56, 182 42, 182 210, 28 210, 28
5 294, 182 294, 182 294, 182 294, 182 294, 182 280, 182 266, 182 252, 182 238, 182 224, 182 210, 182 196, 182 182, 182 168, 182 154, 182 140, 182 126, 182 112, 182 98, 182 84, 182 70, 182 56, 182 210, 42 210, 42 210, 42
6 294, 182 294, 182 294, 182 294, 182 294, 182 280, 182 266, 182 252, 182 238, 182 224, 182 210, 182 196, 182 182, 182 168, 182 154, 182 140, 182 126, 182 112, 182 98, 182 84, 182 70, 182 210, 56 210, 56 210, 56 210, 56
7 294, 182 294, 182 294, 182 294, 182 294, 182 280, 182 266, 182 252, 182 238, 182 224, 182 210, 182 196, 182 182, 182 168, 182 154, 182 140, 182 126, 182 112, 182 98, 182 84, 182 210, 70 210, 70 210, 70 210, 70 210, 70
Type 1's 
8 294, 182 294, 182 294, 182 294, 182 294, 182 280, 182 266, 182 252, 182 238, 182 224, 182 210, 182 196, 182 182, 182 168, 182 154, 182 140, 182 126, 182 112, 182 98, 182 84, 182 210, 84 210, 84 210, 84 210, 84 210, 84
number
9 294, 182 294, 182 294, 182 294, 182 294, 182 280, 182 266, 182 252, 182 238, 182 224, 182 210, 182 196, 182 182, 182 168, 182 154, 182 140, 182 126, 182 112, 182 210, 98 210, 98 210, 98 210, 98 210, 98 210, 98 210, 98
10 294, 182 294, 182 294, 182 294, 182 294, 182 280, 182 266, 182 252, 182 238, 182 224, 182 210, 182 196, 182 182, 182 168, 182 154, 182 140, 182 126, 182 210, 112 210, 112 210, 112 210, 112 210, 112 210, 112 210, 112 210, 112
11 294, 182 294, 182 294, 182 294, 182 294, 182 280, 182 266, 182 252, 182 238, 182 224, 182 210, 182 196, 182 182, 182 168, 182 154, 182 140, 182 210, 126 210, 126 210, 126 210, 126 210, 126 210, 126 210, 126 210, 126 210, 126
12 294, 182 294, 182 294, 182 294, 182 294, 182 280, 182 266, 182 252, 182 238, 182 224, 182 210, 182 196, 182 182, 182 168, 182 154, 182 210, 140 210, 140 210, 140 210, 140 210, 140 210, 140 210, 140 210, 140 210, 140 210, 140
13 294, 182 294, 182 294, 182 294, 182 294, 182 280, 182 266, 182 252, 182 238, 182 224, 182 210, 182 196, 182 182, 182 168, 182 210, 154 210, 154 210, 154 210, 154 210, 154 210, 154 210, 154 210, 154 210, 154 210, 154 210, 154
14 294, 182 294, 182 294, 182 294, 182 294, 182 280, 182 266, 182 252, 182 238, 182 224, 182 210, 182 196, 182 182, 182 210, 168 210, 168 210, 168 210, 168 210, 168 210, 168 210, 168 210, 168 210, 168 210, 168 210, 168 210, 168
15 294, 182 294, 182 294, 182 294, 182 294, 182 280, 182 266, 182 252, 182 238, 182 224, 182 210, 182 196, 182 210, 182 210, 182 210, 182 210, 182 210, 182 210, 182 210, 182 210, 182 210, 182 210, 182 210, 182 210, 182 210, 182
16 294, 182 294, 182 294, 182 294, 182 294, 182 280, 182 266, 182 252, 182 238, 182 224, 182 210, 182 210, 196 210, 196 210, 196 210, 196 210, 196 210, 196 210, 196 210, 196 210, 196 210, 196 210, 196 210, 196 210, 196 210, 196
17 294, 182 294, 182 294, 182 294, 182 294, 182 280, 182 266, 182 252, 182 238, 182 224, 182 210, 210 210, 210 210, 210 210, 210 210, 210 210, 210 210, 210 210, 210 210, 210 210, 210 210, 210 210, 210 210, 210 210, 210 210, 210
18 294, 182 294, 182 294, 182 294, 182 294, 182 280, 182 266, 182 252, 182 238, 182 210, 244 210, 244 210, 244 210, 244 210, 244 210, 244 210, 244 210, 244 210, 244 210, 244 210, 244 210, 244 210, 244 210, 244 210, 244 210, 244
19 294, 182 294, 182 294, 182 294, 182 294, 182 280, 182 266, 182 252, 182 210, 238 210, 238 210, 238 210, 238 210, 238 210, 238 210, 238 210, 238 210, 238 210, 238 210, 238 210, 238 210, 238 210, 238 210, 238 210, 238 210, 238
20 294, 182 294, 182 294, 182 294, 182 294, 182 280, 182 266, 182 210, 252 210, 252 210, 252 210, 252 210, 252 210, 252 210, 252 210, 252 210, 252 210, 252 210, 252 210, 252 210, 252 210, 252 210, 252 210, 252 210, 252 210, 252
21 294, 182 294, 182 294, 182 294, 182 294, 182 280, 182 210, 266 210, 266 210, 266 210, 266 210, 266 210, 266 210, 266 210, 266 210, 266 210, 266 210, 266 210, 266 210, 266 210, 266 210, 266 210, 266 210, 266 210, 266 210, 266
22 294, 182 294, 182 294, 182 294, 182 294, 182 210, 280 210, 280 210, 280 210, 280 210, 280 210, 280 210, 280 210, 280 210, 280 210, 280 210, 280 210, 280 210, 280 210, 280 210, 280 210, 280 210, 280 210, 280 210, 280 210, 280
23 294, 182 294, 182 294, 182 294, 182 210, 294 210, 294 210, 294 210, 294 210, 294 210, 294 210, 294 210, 294 210, 294 210, 294 210, 294 210, 294 210, 294 210, 294 210, 294 210, 294 210, 294 210, 294 210, 294 210, 294 210, 294
24 294, 168 294, 168 294, 168 196, 294 210, 294 210, 294 210, 294 210, 294 210, 294 210, 294 210, 294 210, 294 210, 294 210, 294 210, 294 210, 294 210, 294 210, 294 210, 294 210, 294 210, 294 210, 294 210, 294 210, 294 210, 294
25 294, 154 294, 154 182, 294 196, 294 210, 294 210, 294 210, 294 210, 294 210, 294 210, 294 210, 294 210, 294 210, 294 210, 294 210, 294 210, 294 210, 294 210, 294 210, 294 210, 294 210, 294 210, 294 210, 294 210, 294 210, 294
Table 5.  Dominant Strategy Equilibria, Nash Equilibria, Pareto Efficient Outcomes in Treatment P.Payoff Table (for the Actual Experiment)  S1
The number which you choose
123456789 1 0 1 1 1 2 1 3 1 4 1 5 1 6 1 7 1 8 1 9 2 0 2 1 2 2 2 3 2 4 2 5
1 116 124 131 138 144 150 154 158 161 164 166 167 167 167 166 164 161 158 154 150 144 138 131 124 116
2 124 132 140 146 152 158 162 166 170 172 174 175 175 175 174 172 170 166 162 158 152 146 140 132 124
3 131 140 147 154 160 165 170 174 177 180 181 182 183 182 181 180 177 174 170 165 160 154 147 140 131
4 138 146 154 161 167 172 177 181 184 186 188 189 190 189 188 186 184 181 177 172 167 161 154 146 138
5 144 152 160 167 173 178 183 187 190 192 194 195 196 195 194 192 190 187 183 178 173 167 160 152 144
6 150 158 165 172 178 184 188 192 195 198 200 201 201 201 200 198 195 192 188 184 178 172 165 158 150
The number  7 154 162 170 177 183 188 193 197 200 202 204 205 206 205 204 202 200 197 193 188 183 177 170 162 154
which the  8 158 166 174 181 187 192 197 201 204 206 208 209 210 209 208 206 204 201 197 192 187 181 174 166 158
other person 9 161 170 177 184 190 195 200 204 207 210 211 212 213 212 211 210 207 204 200 195 190 184 177 170 161
chooses 10 164 172 180 186 192 198 202 206 210 212 214 215 215 215 214 212 210 206 202 198 192 186 180 172 164
11 166 174 181 188 194 200 204 208 211 214 216 217 217 217 216 214 211 208 204 200 194 188 181 174 166
12 167 175 182 189 195 201 205 209 212 215 217 218 218 218 217 215 212 209 205 201 195 189 182 175 167
13 167 175 183 190 196 201 206 210 213 215 217 218 219 218 217 215 213 210 206 201 196 190 183 175 167
14 167 175 182 189 195 201 205 209 212 215 217 218 218 218 217 215 212 209 205 201 195 189 182 175 167
15 166 174 181 188 194 200 204 208 211 214 216 217 217 217 216 214 211 208 204 200 194 188 181 174 166
16 164 172 180 186 192 198 202 206 210 212 214 215 215 215 214 212 210 206 202 198 192 186 180 172 164
17 161 170 177 184 190 195 200 204 207 210 211 212 213 212 211 210 207 204 200 195 190 184 177 170 161
18 158 166 174 181 187 192 197 201 204 206 208 209 210 209 208 206 204 201 197 192 187 181 174 166 158
19 154 162 170 177 183 188 193 197 200 202 204 205 206 205 204 202 200 197 193 188 183 177 170 162 154
20 150 158 165 172 178 184 188 192 195 198 200 201 201 201 200 198 195 192 188 184 178 172 165 158 150
21 144 152 160 167 173 178 183 187 190 192 194 195 196 195 194 192 190 187 183 178 173 167 160 152 144
22 138 146 154 161 167 172 177 181 184 186 188 189 190 189 188 186 184 181 177 172 167 161 154 146 138
23 131 140 147 154 160 165 170 174 177 180 181 182 183 182 181 180 177 174 170 165 160 154 147 140 131
24 124 132 140 146 152 158 162 166 170 172 174 175 175 175 174 172 170 166 162 158 152 146 140 132 124
25 116 124 131 138 144 150 154 158 161 164 166 167 167 167 166 164 161 158 154 150 144 138 131 124 116
Table 6.  Payoff Table of Type 1 distributed in Treatment S.Payoff Table (for the Actual Experiment)  S2
The number which you choose
123456789 1 0 1 1 1 2 1 3 1 4 1 5 1 6 1 7 1 8 1 9 2 0 2 1 2 2 2 3 2 4 2 5
1 12 24 35 45 55 64 72 80 86 92 98 102 106 110 112 114 115 115 115 114 112 110 106 102 98
2 24 36 47 57 67 76 84 91 98 104 110 114 118 121 124 126 127 127 127 126 124 121 118 114 110
3 35 47 58 68 78 87 95 102 109 115 121 125 129 132 135 137 138 138 138 137 135 132 129 125 121
4 45 57 68 79 88 97 105 113 120 126 131 136 140 143 145 147 148 149 148 147 145 143 140 136 131
5 55 67 78 88 98 107 115 122 129 135 141 145 149 152 155 157 158 158 158 157 155 152 149 145 141
6 64 76 87 97 107 116 124 131 138 144 150 154 158 161 164 166 167 167 167 166 164 161 158 154 150
The number  7 72 84 95 105 115 124 132 140 146 152 158 162 166 170 172 174 175 175 175 174 172 170 166 162 158
which the  8 80 91 102 113 122 131 140 147 154 160 165 170 174 177 180 181 182 183 182 181 180 177 174 170 165
other person 9 86 98 109 120 129 138 146 154 161 167 172 177 181 184 186 188 189 190 189 188 186 184 181 177 172
chooses 10 92 104 115 126 135 144 152 160 167 173 178 183 187 190 192 194 195 196 195 194 192 190 187 183 178
11 98 110 121 131 141 150 158 165 172 178 184 188 192 195 198 200 201 201 201 200 198 195 192 188 184
12 102 114 125 136 145 154 162 170 177 183 188 193 197 200 202 204 205 206 205 204 202 200 197 193 188
13 106 118 129 140 149 158 166 174 181 187 192 197 201 204 206 208 209 210 209 208 206 204 201 197 192
14 110 121 132 143 152 161 170 177 184 190 195 200 204 207 210 211 212 213 212 211 210 207 204 200 195
15 112 124 135 145 155 164 172 180 186 192 198 202 206 210 212 214 215 215 215 214 212 210 206 202 198
16 114 126 137 147 157 166 174 181 188 194 200 204 208 211 214 216 217 217 217 216 214 211 208 204 200
17 115 127 138 148 158 167 175 182 189 195 201 205 209 212 215 217 218 218 218 217 215 212 209 205 201
18 115 127 138 149 158 167 175 183 190 196 201 206 210 213 215 217 218 219 218 217 215 213 210 206 201
19 115 127 138 148 158 167 175 182 189 195 201 205 209 212 215 217 218 218 218 217 215 212 209 205 201
20 114 126 137 147 157 166 174 181 188 194 200 204 208 211 214 216 217 217 217 216 214 211 208 204 200
21 112 124 135 145 155 164 172 180 186 192 198 202 206 210 212 214 215 215 215 214 212 210 206 202 198
22 110 121 132 143 152 161 170 177 184 190 195 200 204 207 210 211 212 213 212 211 210 207 204 200 195
23 106 118 129 140 149 158 166 174 181 187 192 197 201 204 206 208 209 210 209 208 206 204 201 197 192
24 102 114 125 136 145 154 162 170 177 183 188 193 197 200 202 204 205 206 205 204 202 200 197 193 188
25 98 110 121 131 141 150 158 165 172 178 184 188 192 195 198 200 201 201 201 200 198 195 192 188 184
Table 7.  Payoff Table of Type 2 distributed in Treatment S.  Dominant Strategy Equilibrium   Good Nash Equilibrium
  Bad Nash Equilibrium
Type 2's number
123456789 1 0 1 1 1 2 1 3 1 4 1 5 1 6 1 7 1 8 1 9 2 0 2 1 2 2 2 3 2 4 2 5 s u m
1 11 2
21 1 2 4
3 0
4 21 1 4












15 21 1 4
1 6 1 12 3 4 2 7 55441121 13 9 2









s u m 00001101012 6 5 6 9 555453421015 1 8 0
Table 8. Data Frequency in Treatment P. 
 
 
 (1)  (2) 
  Individuals play dominant 
strategies 
Pairs play dominant 
strategy equilibrium 
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Observations 720  360 
Log-likelihood -247.2  -211.3 
Restricted log-likelihood  -344.5  -231.8 
Notes: Standard errors shown in parentheses. ** denotes significantly different from zero 
at five-percent. The model in column (1) is estimated with a random subjects effect error 
term εit = ui + vit, and the model in column (2) is estimated with clustering at the session 
level. 
 
Table 9. Probit Models of Individual and Pair Dominant Strategy Play 
 
 